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Article 1

ARTICLES

The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and
Corporate Social Responsibility
Daniel J. Morrissey†
“Do the dynamics of private capital accumulation inevitably lead to
concentration of wealth in ever fewer hands . . . ?”1

INTRODUCTION
Corporations exist primarily to make profit for their
shareholders. This has been the black letter rule of law and the
reigning orthodoxy of American business for a century.2 For
most of the last 100 years, large corporations3 have been the
prime vehicles for providing needed goods and services while
they have continually improved their products to better satisfy
their consumers. They have also provided stable jobs for
countless workers. Yet through the years certain legal and social
theorists have advocated that these business behemoths should
† Professor and former Dean, Gonzaga University School of Law. The author
wishes to thank his faculty colleague, Kevin Michels, faculty research librarian Kurt
Meyer and student assistant Alex Biel for their help in the preparation of this article.
The author did much of the research for this Article at the University of Tulsa’s fine
law library. He would like to thank Janet Levit, the Dean there, for her kind
hospitality and acknowledge the valuable assistance of Head Librarian Melanie Nelson
and Assistant Librarians Mark Mayer and Richard Todd. The author would also like to
thank Dean Jane Korn of the Gonzaga University Law School and Associate Dean
Jason Gilmer for their support for this Article. The article is dedicated to the author’s
brothers Pat and Ray Morrissey in celebration of their 50th birthday.
1 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1 (Arthur
Goldhammer, trans., President and Fellows of Harvard College 2014) (2013)
2 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 681 (1919); see also infra notes 7, 8,
13 and accompanying text.
3 Today there are approximately 6,700 large public companies whose shares
are actively traded. Even though they comprise a small fraction of the 5.8 million U.S.
businesses operating in the corporate form, these firms generate the lion’s share of our
country’s economic activity. HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A
LAWYER’S GUIDE 1 (2011).
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have a broader mandate. In the last several decades that outlook
has grown to a large scale movement called corporate social
responsibility (CSR). It asserts that a more expansive corporate
mission is needed now more than ever as income inequality has
increased to alarming proportions and environmental issues
threaten the sustainability of life on our planet.
This Article contends that both these corporate goals,
profit and social responsibility, are compatible. Shareholders
play an indispensable role in the structure of American
business. In addition, economic gain, if widely shared, is a major
benefit to our common life. Yet corporate leaders, as stewards of
our society’s resources, must also be charged with serving the
larger interests of their workers and the communities where
they do business. A federal law should mandate that obligation.
This Article will begin in Part I with a discussion of the
origins of the rule that corporations must be run primarily to
make profit for their shareholders. The Article will next
explain in Part II the important role that shareholders play in
the corporate structure. It will trace how stockholders were
initially instrumental in America’s industrial development, yet
because of the rise of a managerial class they lost their ability to
control the enterprises that they owned. Part III will then discuss
the role of shareholders in improving corporate governance. Part
IV will describe the rise of CSR as a respected corporate objective
and conclude with a call for a national corporate law that would
provide a structure to hold corporations to a standard consistent
with the goals of CSR.
I.

THE RULE OF PROFIT AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

As valuable as shareholders are in our economic system,
their rights are not paramount. Such was the approach taken by
the pre-industrial common law as Anglo-American cases
stressed the communal duties of early corporations.4 Yet as large
scale manufacturing took hold the law began to move in another
direction. By the second half of the nineteenth century, it had
made the shareholders’ right to profit a firm’s dominant duty.

4 As the leading English jurist of the eighteenth century stated, “[I]t has
been found necessary . . . to constitute artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual
succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immorality. These artificial persons are called
bodies politics, bodies corporate, (corpora corporate), or corporations; of which there is a
great variety subsisting, for the advancement of religion, of learning, and of
commerce . . . .” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *467-68 .
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One scholar has called that era’s approach to the central
issue of corporate law “a curious admixture of classical
economics, Neo-Calvinism, Social Darwinism, Lockean Political
Philosophy and a large component of antistatism.”5 That was
also the time when laissez-faire economics reigned supreme,
and an age, correspondingly, when property and contract rights
were given strong constitutional protection.6
In this high capitalist culture it should not have been a
surprise when a court invalidated a contrary business
philosophy even when it was practiced by a leading industrialist,
Henry Ford, who owned a majority of the stock of his car company
and controlled its board.7 Ford’s firm was lushly profitable and he
wanted to use part of its surplus to reduce the retail price of its
automobiles.8 Ford had already become a household name for
raising his workers base pay to five dollars per day.9
When the Dodge brothers, who owned 10 percent of the
company’s stock, challenged Ford’s policy of minimum
dividends he expressly defended it with these philanthropic
sentiments, “My ambition . . . is to employ still more men; to
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest
possible number, to help them build up their lives and their
homes. To do this we are putting the greatest share of our
profits back into the business.”10
Ford’s approach, though daring, was not novel. He was
following earlier industrialists from the late nineteenth century
such as William Lever, a famed English soap manufacturer,
and George Pullman, the American railroad car magnet.11 Both
established company towns near their operations in Liverpool
and Chicago where the needs of their workers could be
fulfilled.12 To be sure, self-interest was at work there because
such a beneficent and paternalistic strategy was designed to
5 See Edwin M. Epstein, Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on
Corporate Social Responsibility—Produce and Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1295 (1979).
6 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
7 See Hedrick Smith, When Capitalists Cared, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2012 at
A19,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/opinion/henry-ford-whencapitalists-cared.html.
8 Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 683 (1919).
9 Smith, supra note 7. Recent studies, however, show that today those with
wealth and power pay scant attention to people without it. Daniel Goleman, Rich
People Just Care Less, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION PAGES, Oct. 6, 2013 at SR12, available at
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/05/rich-people-just-care-less.
10 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671.
11 N. Craig Smith, When it Comes to CSR, Size Matters, FORBES (Aug. 14,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insead/2013/08/14/when-it-comes-to-csr-size-matters/.
12 Id.
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quell labor unrest. Yet it was also a forthright plan to share the
wealth generated by those companies.
In spite of the clear social good resulting from Ford’s
philanthropy, the Michigan Supreme Court found that Ford’s
dividends were too small for a company with such huge profits.
The Justices rejected Ford’s policies with these forceful
remarks that became the definitive law on corporate purpose.
There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties
which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the
general public and the duties which in law he and his co-directors owe
to protesting, minority stockholders. A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.
The powers of directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the choice of the
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end
itself, to the reduction of profits, or the non-distribution of profits
among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.13

That attitude, however, was not universal, even in that
era. Other cases and statutes permitted corporations to make
charitable donations if they served the business in some way,14
and some social advocates were even arguing for a fuller vision
of corporate purpose. As one put it, “[N]ot merely public office
but private business is a public trust.”15 President Theodore
Roosevelt railed against the “Malefactors of Great Wealth” and
in an address to Congress he asserted, “Great corporations
exist only because they are created and safeguarded by our
institutions; and it is therefore our right and our duty to see
that they work in harmony with these institutions.”16
Likewise, Henry Higginson, a prominent Boston
businessman, made these remarks in 1911, a time coincident to
the “Social Gospel movement”17 that was pushing American
Protestantism to apply Christian principles to questions of
social justice.
I do not believe that, because a man owns property, it belongs to him
to do with as he pleases. The property belongs to the community, and
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. § 1164 (West 1918); People v. Hotchkiss, 120
N.Y.S. 649 (App. Div. 1909); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
15 Albion W. Small, Private Business is a Public Trust, 1 AM. J. SOC. 276, 282 (1895).
16 President Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3,
1901). A fine new book on his clash with his hand-picked successor, William Howard
Taft, is DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, THE BULLY PULPIT: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFT, AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF JOURNALISM (2013).
17 See, e.g., WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL CRISIS (1907).
This is considered one of the leading statements of the Social Gospel philosophy.
13
14
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he has charge of it, and can dispose of it, if it is well done and not
with the sole regard to himself or to his stockholders.18

The stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting Great
Depression brought about a new public attitude about the
social responsibility of business. Even Republican President
Herbert Hoover made this telling critique of the American
economic system, “The trouble with capitalism is the capitalists;
they’re damn greedy.”19 His successor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
went further in his first inaugural address, admonishing “conduct
in banking and in business which too often has given to a sacred
trust the likeness of callous and selfish wrongdoing.”20
Roosevelt’s New Deal responded with landmark federal
legislation regulating the sale of securities21 as well as the
markets in which they are traded.22 It established a disclosure
regime where public companies were compelled to lay bare all
important aspects of their businesses.23 While those federal
securities laws contained little substantive regulation of
corporations, they at least established that publicly-held firms
would be accountable to their shareholders and society at large by
having to truthfully inform them about their operations and
financial conditions. In addition, the statutes set up the SEC as a
new federal regulatory agency, empowered to make rules
delineating the particular disclosures public companies would be
required to make in their periodic reports and proxy statements.24
Those hard economic times also caused commentators
and even business leaders themselves to reassess the duties of
public companies. Some urged that corporations undertake
civic responsibilities. Professor Merrick Dodd became one of the
18 ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 260 (1985) (quoting
Henry Higginson).
19 David Shipley, Editorial Notebook; Remembering Herbert Hoover, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/10/opinion/editorial-notebookremembering-herbert-hoover.html.
20 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933).
21 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (2012).
22 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)
[hereinafter Exchange Act].
23 See id. §§ 13(a), 14(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a).
24 Section 4 of the Exchange Act established the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78d. Sections
12(b) and 12(g) of that Act require that companies commonly described as “exchangelisted” and “publicly-held” companies register with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b),(g).
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act then requires that these “reporting companies” file
annual, quarterly, and current reports on forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K respectively. 17
C.F.R. § 240.13a-1, 240.13a-13, 240.13a-11 (2010). Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act
empowers the SEC to make rules regarding proxy solicitation by reporting companies. 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a). Using this authority, the SEC has promulgated elaborate rules for
disclosure to shareholders. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1–240.14a-14.
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prime spokespersons for this new vision of “corporate
statesmanship.”25 Managers of firms, he said, should not just be
concerned with making profit for stockholders, but ought to
consider themselves fiduciaries and act for all who are
impacted by their firms. Those constituents would include their
workers and the communities where they do business.
Dodd was also the first to speak of what has become the
“team” concept of a corporation.26 As the Latin origin of its
name connotes, a corporation is a “body,” not just a collection of
individuals.27 Its leaders should therefore make sure its actions
benefit the entity as a whole, rather than just one of its
members, the shareholders. Dodd also drew from the new
Keynesian economics that was having a profound impact on
policy makers.28 He asserted that actions which serve the
interests of a firm’s broader groups, like the payment of good
wages to its workers, also redound to the advantage of its
shareholders by creating stronger purchasing power for the
company’s products.29
A prominent case in the immediate post-war era
epitomized how Dodd’s more expansive views had taken hold.30
When a shareholder challenged a corporate contribution to
Princeton University by his New Jersey based firm, the highest
state court resoundingly affirmed the appropriateness of the
donation. It first found that the gift was in the corporation’s
“enlightened self-interest” by creating goodwill for the firm and
helping to educate its future workers.31 However, the court
went beyond that to uphold the contribution because of the
company’s broader obligations to society. Most of America’s
wealth, the court observed, is held by corporations and as such it
is appropriate for them “to assume the modern obligations of
good citizenship in the same manner as humans do.”32 “[M]odern
conditions,” it said, “require that corporations acknowledge and

25 Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1932).
26 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 303 (1999).
27 James Morwood, ed., Corpus Definition, OXFORD REFERENCE: POCKET
OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (2012), http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/
acref/9780191739583.001.0001/b-la-en-00001-0002507?rskey=TBld3u&result=1.
28 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT
INTEREST AND MONEY 3 (1936).
29 Dodd, supra note 25, at 1156.
30 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
31 See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 681-84 (1986).
32 A.P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586.
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discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of
the communities within which they operate.”33
The post-war era however saw little real movement to
define or embrace CSR beyond limited philanthropic activity. It
was a time of collective complacency when the tradition
“shareholder primacy” paradigm was generally accepted without
question. One notable exception was the far-sighted management
expert Peter Drucker. He argued that business leaders should
also be concerned with political or social issues that might be
important to their “alternative constituencies,” like workers
and consumers.34
Even most liberals then believed that the “regulatory
state” established by the New Deal was sufficient to guarantee
that corporations would not harm the public interest.35 The
business elite seemed to go along with that system by not
challenging those bureaucracies. It was thus no surprise that
in that era of relative good feeling, corporate law did nothing to
particularly prescribe how businesses must act.
As one commentator said, corporate codes then were
just a “black box,” a series of rules governing the technical
operation of those firms, having no real effect on what public
companies actually did.36 In the same vein, another legal
scholar of that period said corporate law had become “trivial,”37
and one more described it with rhetorical flourish as “great
empty corporation statutes—towering skyscrapers of rusted
girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but
wind.”38 In sum, corporate law then contained no requirements
pertaining to how businesses should behave, and it prescribed
no goals for them other than profit-making.
Id. at 585-86.
Jerome J. Shestack, Corporate Social and the Lawyer in the 21st Century, in
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 403 (2011); see also LORRAINE TALBOT, PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 105 (2013).
35 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994). But see David G.
Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility
After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197 (2011). The author argues that because of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, which struck down laws limiting political
spending by corporations, those firms will be much more able to influence government. As
a result it will be less able to restrict corporate excesses that are visited on nonshareholding stakeholders such as workers and consumers. Boards must therefore play
that role, the author urges, and be attentive to the needs of those groups.
36 Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do
Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 327 (1996).
37 Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990).
38 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L. J. 233, 245 n.37 (1962).
33

34
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All that would change, however, in the period of unrest
that became known as the 1960s. The civil rights and anti-war
movements of that time inspired an idealistic youth culture
that brought about a generalized discontent with the status
quo.39 As concern for the historically disadvantaged and the
environment took center stage, corporations became the focal
point of much of that dissatisfaction.40 Reformers like Ralph
Nader claimed that corporations were responsible for a number
of significant evils.41 Those evils included industrial pollution,
unsafe products, deceptive advertising, and discriminatory
employment practices.42 In addition, critics attacked the
dominant corporate culture as alienating and stressful.43
One early response to that dissatisfaction was the growth
of in-house corporate foundations. Some firms, such as DaytonHudson, Levi Strauss, and Cummins Engines, began giving up
to five percent of their pre-tax earnings to eleemosynary
efforts.44 But an even more significant result was the beginning
of the CSR movement.45 CSR’s influence reached its first highpoint in the mid-1970s when prominent legal scholars joined
with social activists to urge that the federal government replace
states as the ultimate source of corporate law.46
Federal chartering of corporations, they argued, should
displace state-based regimes where jurisdictions like Delaware had
won the race to the bottom with their lax standards for
management’s conduct.47 The ensuing federal law would then
require better governance practices and mandate that corporations
engage in socially beneficial activity that would be enforced by
public interest directors.48 Such a mandate would put pressure on
corporations to act in a more socially responsible manner.
Those fervent efforts at reform, however, met strong
immediate resistance from laissez-faire economists, most

See TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 12-14 (1987).
See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Politicization of the Corporation, 51 B.U. L.
REV. 425, 426 (1971).
41 See generally RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
42 Id. at 17-24.
43 See id. at 27.
44 Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., MayJune 1994, at 105, 107 .
45 Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1207, 1211-12 (2002).
46 TALBOT, supra note 34, at 113.
47 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663, 705 (1974).
48 Branson, supra note 45, at 1213-14.
39

40
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prominently Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman.49 He countered
that a corporate official is merely an employee of its
shareholders—the owners of the business. As such, he wrote:
[A corporate executive] has direct responsibility to his employers.
That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with
their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as
possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.50

For Friedman, non-profit activity was not the business
of business, but of government and private charity. In addition,
as other defenders of the traditional view noted, if corporate
goals other than profit-maximizing were legitimate, boards
would be divided and distracted from achieving the highest
return on the capital entrusted to them.51 The rights of other
corporate “constituents,” such as employees and creditors
should therefore be set only by the contracts they make with
the firm.52 Management, they argued, should just be attentive
to the wishes of its masters, the shareholders.
These attitudes were quickly re-enforced by two new
developments, one in politics and the other in legal scholarship.
By the late 1970s, a resurgence of conservatism was taking hold,
first signaled by the taxpayers’ revolt of Proposition 13 in
California.53 Part of its agenda was to deregulate business. That
was at first tentatively embraced by the Carter administration
and then welcomed without reserve by President Reagan after
his election in 1980. Reagan’s presidency ushered in a new, fullthroated form of capitalism that became the “Greed is Good,”54
era—hardly an attitude that would be friendly to any
diversions of business from its profit-making goals.

49 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of
Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
50 Id.
51 See Bayless Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (1977).
52 See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1198 (1984).
53 Officially titled the “The People’s Initiative to Limit Property Taxation,”
Proposition 13 was approved by a California voter referendum in 1978 and is now
Article 13A of the Constitution of the state of California.
54 Financier Ivan Boesky made that signature statement at a business school
commencement speech shortly before he was indicted for insider trading. PATRICK DILLON &
CARL M. CANNON, CIRCLE OF GREED: THE SPECTACULAR RISE AND FALL OF AMERICA’S MOST
FEARED AND LOATHED LAWYER 108 (2010). It was the template for Gordon Gekko’s famous
declaration in Oliver Stone’s 1987 movie, WALL STREET (20th Century Fox Film Corp.
1987). Michael Douglas won an academy award for his role as Gekko.
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Going hand in hand with those political events was a
new school of jurisprudence, law and economics.55 Legal rules,
it held, should promote the efficient allocation of society’s
resources, and the best way to do that was to encourage market
forces. Any laws which interfered with that pricing mechanism
were considered harmful to wealth enhancement. Private
ordering by contract was therefore the preferred mode of
business organization and a corporation was seen as a mere
“nexus” of those relationships.56 This highly individualist
approach left all members of the corporate community except
stockholders to fend for themselves and prescribed no other
duties for corporate officials other than maximizing the value
of their shares.57 In doing so they would benefit the holders of
those instruments—the owners of their firms.
II.

THE INDISPENSABLE SHAREHOLDER

The law governing for-profit corporations provides that
there must be some group that has the final claim on their
wealth58 and there also must be someone to whom their directors
are accountable.59 Common shareholders occupy both positions.
They supply a firm’s risk capital and therefore have the ultimate
entrepreneurial stake in the company. They are also the
residual owners of its profits and thus the ones to whom its
managers must be responsible. Shareholders are therefore
fundamental constituents of a for-profit corporation.
Such a system of private investing has many virtues. It
can channel economic resources to their most efficient uses
because it rewards intelligent risk-takers with the profits from
their investments. It is also an altogether good idea to
encourage wide-spread holdings in the equity of our country’s
businesses. Half of American households are shareholders;
either directly or through their retirement plans.60 Since stock
55 The founding text in that school is RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973).
56 Jeffrey Bone, Legal Perspective on Corporate Responsibility: Contractarian
or Communitarian Thought?, 24 CAN. J. L. & J. 277, 285 (2011) (contrasting this
viewpoint to a more communal notion of the corporation).
57 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164,
1190-92 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
58 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(b)(2) (2002).
59 See id. § 6.01(b)(1).
60 Annie Lowrey, Top 10% Took Home Half of U.S. Income in 2012, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2013, at B4, version available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/the-
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ownership returns more over time than fixed obligations like
bonds or bank deposits, it allows investors to maximize the
growth of their savings.
A.

The Shareholder’s Role in Early American Corporate
History

When the American industrial revolution got started in
earnest in the first part of the nineteenth century, the United
States was already a country with a prosperous middle class.
Since those folks had some savings and were generally eager to
share in the profitability of new firms, businesses found it
advantageous to secure capital from them.61
The corporate form aided that process.62 Limited
liability for shareholders was already one of its standard
features and, by the time of the Civil War, obtaining a
corporate charter had become a simple process.63 By then,
entrepreneurs no longer needed a specific legislative act to
create a corporation but could bring such a separate legal
entity into existence by merely filing certain documents with a
public official.64 The opportunities those developments afforded
business people in the latter decades of the nineteenth century
were aptly described by two leading legal historians.
In the Gilded Age, decades after the Civil War, it was the device of the
corporation that made possible the growth of the new commercial
empires including railroads, steel, iron, rubber, automobiles, food
process, and oil. The corporation allowed for the pooling of vast sums
of capital, an essential requirement for industries with large, fixedcost components: track, locomotives, railway cars, buildings, factories,
furnaces, and machines. With enormous sums of capital at risk, the
limitation on liability worked as the perfect inducement of investors.65

rich-get-richer-through-the-recovery/. A large percentage of that stock ownership, however,
is now held by the richest Americans. Most working people, with little disposable income,
have been unable to participate in the recent stock market gains. James Surowiecki, The
Pay is Too Damn Low, FIN. PAGE: NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/the-pay-is-too-damn-low.
61 See JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH 107 (2004) (recounting,
for instance, how most of the money to build the Erie canal came from small New York
investors while the labor was mostly provided by recent Irish immigrants).
62 Daniel J. Morrissey, Toward a New/Old Theory of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1005, 1006-09 (1989).
63 See J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 26-27, 44, 50-51 (1970).
64 See id. at 70.
65 STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 359 (6th ed. 2006).
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Nicholas Murray Butler, the renowned president of
Columbia University, spoke for many in the early part of the
twentieth century when he praised the privileged status
enjoyed by shareholders and described how it benefited society.
“[I]n my judgment,” he said, “the limited liability corporation is
the greatest single discovery of modern times . . . even steam
and electricity are far less important than the limited liability
corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative
impotence without it.”66
In large enterprises, the corporation’s structure also
provided a distinct governance advantage. It would obviously
be impractical to follow the partnership model there and allow
each of the numerous and far-flung shareholder owners to make
legally binding commitments for the business. Happily, the
corporation solved that problem by centralizing management in
a board of directors and by establishing shareholders who are
the residual owners of corporations. Shareholders elect directors
who have the ultimate managerial power. The directors in turn
select officers to run the day to day affairs of the business.
Under “[t]he basic and [long-standing] principle of U.S.
corporate law”67 stockholders elect the board, but after that
they have no right to make decisions for the business. In
addition, the business judgment rule makes it difficult for
shareholders to challenge actions by directors about corporate
policy, including those that implicate its social responsibility.
An area where vigilant stockholders can provide an
important service for society is by taking an active role in
corporate governance. Two leading authorities describe the ideal
function of corporate governance when “the three key players—
the executives, the board of directors, and the shareholders—
provide through a system of checks and balances a system for a
transparent and accountable system for promoting objectively
determined goals and benchmarks.”68
Problems occur when top executives of public companies
do not act responsibly to promote the interests of their
shareholders and other constituents. Such wrongdoing is often
compounded because their supervisors, the directors, fail to
prevent those transgressions. Officers, in the worst case, may
66 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 21 (1917).
67 Lucian Arye Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 844 (2005).
68 R OBERT A.G. M ONKS & N ELL M INOW , C ORPORATE G OVERNANCE , at xiii
(5th ed. 2011).
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enrich themselves through self-dealing with the corporation.
Guth v. Loft is a good example of that harmful behavior where
a corporate executive usurped an opportunity of the
corporation.69 A leading shareholder advocate recently
described other substantial wrongdoing that boards condone:
Is it fair that CEOs make 700 times what the average worker makes,
even if the chief executive is doing a terrible job and thousands of
workers are laid off? Why do CEOs get awarded huge bonuses by
friendly boards when the share prices are down by double digits and
then get their options reset to lower levels as an “incentive”?70

To a lesser, but also troubling extent, executives may
shirk their duties71 or engage in empire-building that benefits
themselves at the expense of their shareholders.72 Alternatively,
they may follow excessively conservative strategies that protect
their positions but do not serve their stockholders well. That
wrongful conduct may ultimately be just as harmful to the
corporation and society as outright looting.73 Yet it is once again
harder to challenge because corporate officials have the
protection of the business judgment rule, which embodies the
reluctance of courts to review situations where only a board’s
duty of care is implicated.74
B.

Shareholders Lose Their Voice

As large corporations were achieving their pre-eminent
status in the American economy, a new development changed
the nature of how shareholders related to their companies. In
See generally Guth v. Loft. Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
Carl Icahn, Challenging the Imperial Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Sept.
19,
2013,
at
A19,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887324665604579081703521362462. This explosion of wealth at the
upper levels of our society has exacerbated income inequality. See Daniel J. Morrissey,
Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2013).
It has also led to new ostentatious displays of riches, Paul Krugman, The Show-Off
Society, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2014, at A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/09/26/opinion/paul-krugman-the-show-off-society.html.
71 See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 236 (2d ed. 2010).
72 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 536 (1986).
73 See GEVURTZ, supra note 71, at 236-37.
74 As the Delaware Supreme Court put it, “A board of directors enjoys a
presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they
can be attributed to any rational business purpose.” Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720 (Del. 1971). That discretion has been reinforced by the famous Delaware
“raincoat” provision, which allows corporations to amend their articles to exculpate their
officers and directors for improper conduct unless it involves activities like those done in
bad faith, intentional wrongdoing, breaches of duties of loyalty, or knowing violations of
law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1974); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)
(2014) (explaining standards of liability for directors of corporations).
69

70
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the early years of corporate prominence, large stockholders
were typically the directors of their firms.75 As stock became
more widely-held after sale to the public, however, ownership
became diffuse and far-flung. By 1932, as Professors Berle and
Means demonstrated in a well-regarded study, it was rare in
large companies that one shareholder held more than one
percent of the outstanding stock.76 In the mid-1980s Professor
John Coffee summed up those landmark findings with the
following remarks:
A little over fifty years ago, Berle and Means reported that the
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation had
left shareholders effectively powerless, as managers could neither be
ousted from office by shareholders who were widely dispersed, and
therefore incapable of coordinated action, nor disciplined effectively
by the capital market—at least so long as managers could rely on
internal cash flow to finance corporate expansion.77

Yet in the prosperous post-World War II era, no one,
except perhaps the occasional shareholder gadfly, seemed
particularly concerned that stockholders were powerless. De
facto supremacy had gone to a managerial class that
perpetuated its authority by soliciting shareholder proxies to
elect its nominees to the board.78 Yet who could fault the
business elite, which were then guiding the country to
unparalleled productivity and growth?79
As America moved through the twentieth century, the
achievements of its large public companies became legendary.
They developed all kinds of products that promoted higher
75 Andrei Schleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate
Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 462 (1986). In their treatise on Corporate Governance,
A.G. Monks & Nell Minow explain how the great industrialists of that time like John D.
Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, Andrew Mellon, and Cornelius Vanderbilt sold shares of their
companies to the public but continued to dominate them. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 68, at
20; see also TALBOT, supra note 34, at 222 (critically describing ownership patterns, stating,
“[i]n the United States, controlling shareholders in the 19th century sought to dominate the
economy through legal mechanisms such as special charters and trusts”).
76 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 47 (1933).
77 John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strains in the
Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1986).
78 Monks and Minow attribute this “disenfranchisement” of shareholders to
“management’s vastly superior access to the proxy, both procedurally (in terms of
resources) and substantively (in terms of appropriate subject matter).” MONKS & MINOW,
supra note 68, at 125.
79 “In 1965, America’s big companies had a hell of a year. The stock market
was booming. Sales were rising briskly, profit margins were fat, and corporate profits
as a percentage of G.D.P. were at an all-time high.” James Surowiecki, Open Season,
FIN.
PAGE:
NEW
YORKER
(Oct.
21,
2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2013/10/21/open-season-3.
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standards of living and became places where vast numbers of
employees could anticipate steady, profitable employment.
They constructed our infrastructure and financed scientific
research that led to further increases in our standard of living.
Professor Lawrence Mitchell aptly laid out their successes:
The modern American business corporation has been a subject of
wonder . . . for innovative and risky projects that create technological
miracles and human comforts . . . Wonder, because in these ways
modern American business corporations have created material wellbeing that allows so many people to live the eighteenth-century
liberal ideal on which America was founded, an ideal of individual
freedom, autonomy, and choice.80

Other observers just as forcefully described the
predominant status that the modern corporation had achieved:
Corporations are such a pervasive element in everyday life that it
can be difficult to step back far enough to see them clearly.
Corporations do not just determine what goods and services are
available in the marketplace, but, more than any other institution,
corporations determine the quality of the air we breathe and the
water we drink, and even where we live.81

C.

The Time of Tender Offers

The post-war era of corporate complacency ended when a
new type of shareholder activism took hold during the 1970s and
1980s. Hostile take-overs then began shaking up the corporate
world. Corporate raiders, as these unwelcomed purchasers were
pejoratively called, tried to gain control of companies by making
public proposals to shareholders to buy their stock at a premium
in cash over their current market prices.82 According to the
emerging law and economics school, however, these tender offers
were really a form of shareholder empowerment where the true
owners could regain a measure of control over the unaccountable
managers of their corporations.83 Inefficient management, they
80 LAWRENCE
E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S
NEWEST EXPORT 1 (2001).
81 MONKS & MINOW, supra note 68, at 9.
82 During that time, the author wrote extensively about that phenomenon.
See Daniel J. Morrissey, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers-Does Anything Go?, 534
TENN. L. REV. 103, 103-05 (1985); Daniel J. Morrissey, Law, Ethics, and the Leveraged
Buyout, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 403, 406 (1988); Daniel J. Morrissey, Safeguarding the
Public Interest in Leveraged Buyouts, 69 OR. L. REV. 47 (1990).
83 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1168-69
(1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841 (1981).
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wrote, fails to make proper use of a firm’s resources, which
causes its stock price to go down.84 The underperforming
company then attracts a hostile bidder who wants to gain
control so he can dismiss the firm’s management and
restructure it to achieve more profitability. Such a result is
good for everyone, according to the theory, except the officers
and directors who are replaced. Shareholders have their wealth
enhanced, the new owner gains from better deployment of the
firm’s resources, and the overall economy is enriched by a more
productive use of corporate wealth. Even the possibility of a
tender offer disciplines an underachieving management to
increase share value to ward off such undesired advances.85
A series of judicial rulings from the Delaware Supreme
Court, however, failed to follow that logic. Instead, they
deferred to the business judgment of incumbent boards and
allowed them to employ various defensive tactics, like poison
pills, to deter unwanted tender offers.86 Yet those decisions also
represented an overall victory for shareholder rights. While
condoning the short-range, anti-takeover strategies of
management, the court also recognized a board’s ultimate duty
to increase shareholder value. That would become a compelling
consideration when a decision was made to sell the company
because management would then have to actively seek the
highest bid for its firm.87
The tender offer movement re-empowered shareholders
by affording them more lucrative offers for their stock than
existed in the trading market.88 The potential for such hostile
take-overs would, according to law and economics theory, lead
incumbent managements to make their firms more profitable.
As a consequence, a corporation might have to forgo socially
beneficial activity that could reduce its bottom line.

Easterbrook, supra note 83, at 1196-97.
In the same vein, Judge Henry Friendly called takeovers “the sharpest
blade for the improvement of corporate management.” See Henry J. Friendly, Senior
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Speech to the ALI-ABA (May 4-6, 1978), in 3 ALI-ABA
COURSE MATERIALS J. 128 (1978).
86 Chief among those were Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985) and Moran v. Householder Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
87 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
88 As one author wrote of that phenomenon, “[d]uring the 1980s, nearly half of all
U.S. companies were restructured, more than 80,000 were acquired or merged, and over
700,000 sought bankruptcy protection in order to reorganize and continue operations.”
ANDREW J. SHERMAN, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS FROM A TO Z, at xii (3d. ed. 2010).
84

85
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The Court Protects More Than Profit Maximizing
Corporate Decisions

That unfortunate result, however, was blunted by a
series of decisions from Delaware affirming management’s
prerogative to adopt defensive measures that could, up to a
point, thwart hostile bids. In one such leading opinion, Unocal
v. Mesa Petroleum, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
directors facing a tender offer could consider the effect that it
might have on constituencies other than its shareholders.89
Those would include “creditors, customers, employees,
and . . . the community.”90 This helped CSR because it gave
management some leeway to make decisions based on factors
other than profit.
Likewise, that High Court stated a year later that so long
as the directors have not made a decision to sell the company,
“[a] board may have regard for various constituents . . . provided
there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders.”91 Three years later the Delaware Supreme Court
refined that position, giving the board the power to reject even a
high priced offer if it was not “offered by a reputable and
responsible bidder.”92 A board might make that determination
based at least in part on concerns for corporate constituents
other than shareholders.93
The same year, in Paramount Communications v. Time,
Inc., Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen refused a
shareholder’s request to enjoin a merger entered into to
forestall a hostile takeover.94 The plaintiff stockholder argued
that the combination should be stopped because it would
frustrate the immediate maximization of share value.95 The
Chancellor, however, ruled that management is allowed to
engage in such strategic maneuvers even at the expense of
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955-56.
Id. at 955.
91 Revlon, 506 A.2d. at 182. For comment on how that might impact CSR
issues, see JAMES ROSELLE, The Triple Bottom Line: Building Shareholder Value, in
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 132 (Ramon Mullerat, ed., 2d ed. 2011); see also Anthony Bisonti, The Double
Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations
Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765 (2009).
92 Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 (Del. 1989).
93 RADU MARES, THE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 39 (2008)
(citing D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998)).
94 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670 and 10935,
1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff ’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (unpublished).
95 Id. at *21.
89
90
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short-term shareholder gain.96 The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that absent a limited set of circumstances
management “is not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short-term.” 97
The tender offer epoch also led many state legislatures
to enact so-called “Constituency Statutes” as part of their
corporate codes. These took a broad view of corporate welfare
and specifically gave boards a mandate to consider the effects
of any corporate action upon its non-shareholders stakeholders
such as employees, suppliers, and customers of the
corporation.98 Directors were also allowed to take into account
the effects of their decisions on the “communities in which
offices or other establishments of the corporation are located,
and all other pertinent factors.”99 States amended their
corporate codes allowing boards to adopt a variety of anti-takeover provisions.100 These varied in content but their intended
result was to allow management to impede or delay a hostile bid.
The constituency and anti-takeover statutes were thus designed
to give boards both explicit grounds and specific tactics that they
could use to deter and resist tender offers. As Professor Elhauge
has pointed out, this enhanced respect for a board’s business
judgment allows directors to make non-profit making decisions
that support the goals of CSR.101

Id. at *30.
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d. 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989).
98 See
generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971 (1992); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 579 (1992); Eric W. Otis, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992).
99 MARES, supra note 93, at 38.
100 See id.
101 See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005). As renowned venture capitalist Peter Thiel
points out, however, only firms that have some insulation from competitive markets
may have this room to maneuver. From his perspective in Silicon Valley he writes:
96
97

The problem with a competitive business goes beyond lack of profits. Imagine
you’re running one of those restaurants in Mountain View. You’re not that
different from dozens of your competitors, so you’ve got to fight hard to
survive. If you offer affordable food with low margins, you can probably pay
employees only minimum wage . . . . A monopoly like Google is different.
Since it doesn’t have to worry about competing with anyone, it has wider
latitude to care about its workers, its products, and its impact on the wiser
world. Google’s motto—“Don’t be evil”—is in part a branding ploy, but it’s
also characteristic of a kind of business that’s successful enough to take
ethics seriously without jeopardizing its own existence.
PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS, OR HOW TO BUILD THE FUTURE 31 (2014).
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Such initiatives did not sit well with business groups
and law and economics theorists. They challenged those state
provisions as specifically geared to inhibit contests for
corporate control, which they claimed would promote more
efficient commercial operations and be wealth enhancing for
stockholders.102 Advocates of that position went even further
and claimed that their version of laissez-faire economics was
required by the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.103 The United States Supreme Court, however,
turned aside those arguments finding that absent express
federal pre-emption, corporate law is state law.104 Under the
internal affairs doctrine, states were therefore free to prescribe
the governing rules for businesses that are incorporated in
their jurisdictions.105
CSR advocates also achieved a partial victory during the
1980s when the American Law Institute adopted Section 2.01
of its Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations.106 It began by reaffirming the traditional
purpose of a corporation as profit and shareholder gain.107 In
succeeding paragraphs, however, it qualified that by approving
of other corporate activity although it might not be
remunerative for the firm.108
In subpart (b)(2), the ALI stated that in the conduct of its
business a corporation “[m]ay take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to
the responsible conduct of business.”109 In subpart (b)(3), the ALI
went even further and said that a corporation “[m]ay devote a
reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian,
educational, and philanthropic purposes.”110 In similar fashion,
Section 302(13) of the Revised Model Business Corporations Act,
adopted at about the same time, lists among a corporation’s
general powers, “to make donations for the public welfare or for
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.”111
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91-92 (1987).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 93.
104 CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 93.
105 Id. at 86-87.
106 1 AM. LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, pt. II, § 2.01 (1992). For a good description of the history of
this project, see Douglas M. Branson, Proposal for Corporate Governance Reform: Six
Decades of Ineptitude and Counting, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 673, 683-86 (2013).
107 AM. LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 106, § 2.01.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(13) (2002).
102

103
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For shareholder governance rights to be effective they
must overcome several traditional drawbacks. First is the
“rational apathy” that discourages most stockholders from
reviewing management conduct in the firms where they invest.
Such activity hardly seems worth the effort when a limited
percentage of ownership means there is so little at stake for a
particular stockholder. Better to follow the “Wall Street rule”
and sell, goes the logic, rather than challenge improper practices
by corporate officials.112 Such departures by disgruntled
shareholders may drive down share prices but they do little to
remedy harmful managerial conduct.113
Another
long-standing
barrier
to
shareholder
engagement is management’s control over the mechanism for
soliciting proxies to elect directors.114 Top executives always have
their own slate for those lucrative positions, and a shareholder
who puts forth her competing candidates must pay the
significant expense of garnering support from other
stockholders. Several years ago, the SEC made a rule that would
change that by allowing a significant shareholder to propose her
own nominees for directors and have them sent out at the
company’s expense.115 The Court of Appeals, however,
invalidated that initiative to foster shareholder democracy on
the grounds that the Commission did not do a proper study of
its costs and benefits.116
Yet the push for shareholder participation in corporate
governance continues to gain ground. Commentators keep
assailing the “[d]omination of public companies by self-serving
and ineffective executives [that] costs America billions of
dollars every year and contributed to the current economic
meltdown.”117 The exposure of those abusive practices has
propelled new corporate governance models designed to reform

GEVURTZ, supra note 71, at 232.
See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 68, at 129-30.
114 See GEVURTZ, supra note 71, at 233.
115 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
116 See id. at 1150-51.
117 George W. Dent Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of
Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97 (2010).
112

113
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the “old boy” network of boards that has been all too inclined to
rubberstamp decisions of dominant chief executives.118
At the heart of the models are measures for independent
directors who would serve on audit and compensation committees
to make sure there are meaningful internal checks on fraud and
other illegal activity by management. Several leading academics
have lent their support here, arguing that to counter those
abuses shareholders must be given increased rights to guard
against improper management conduct119 or at least be
empowered to exercise the rights they already have in a more
meaningful way.120
Professor Lucien Bebchuck points out that the interests
of management often are not aligned with those of its
shareholders.121 Consequently, corporate officials may engage in
various self-dealing activities, reject beneficial acquisition offers,
or engage in empire-building.122 To counter that, Bebchuck
persuasively contends that shareholders should be given more
rights to approve or disapprove those major corporation
actions.123 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010’s Say-on-Pay provision124 is a step toward
such enhanced shareholder voting rights. It gives shareholders
the right to express their views on management compensation,
but this required referendum is non-binding.
Professor Julian Velasco differs from Bebchuck, by not
calling for more measures empowering shareholders.125 What is
really needed, he says, is just that stockholders take their
current rights seriously and be supported in that by legal
authorities.126 For instance, Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 already charges the SEC with regulating
proxy solicitations, and the legislative history of that provision
118 Critics also point to the homogeneity of American boards that lack women or
minority group members and are thus overwhelmingly “male, pale, and stale,” Gretchen
Morgenson, Choosing Not to Walk the Walk, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2014, at B1. For an
upcoming article that discusses this issue in the context of European Law, see Catherine
M.A. McCauliff & Catherine Savio, Gender Consideration on the Board of European
Corporations: Lessons for U.S. Corporations or a Cautionary Tale?, 16 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. (forthcoming 2015).
119 See Bebchuck, supra note 67, at 913.
120 See Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 605, 631 (2007).
121 See Bebchuck, supra note 67, at 912-13.
122 Id. at 914.
123 Id.
124 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 951 (2010).
125 See Velasco, supra note 120, at 631.
126 Id. at 634.
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states that regulation must occur for the benefit of investors.127 No
doubt Professor Velsasco would rue the Court of Appeals’ decision
discussed above that struck down the SEC’s proxy access rule.
That would have made it less expensive for shareholders to
nominate their own slate of directors but it fell victim to a judicial
ideology excessively sensitive to management’s prerogatives.128
In other areas, however, Professor Velasco sounds more
like Professor Bebchuck. Velasco points out that shareholder
rights to vote on important matters like mergers and by-law
amendments are severely restricted because directors must
first approve those initiatives.129 He also calls for other reforms
that activist shareholders are already including in settlements
of derivative suits as ways to remedy wrongful management
conduct.130 One of these new requirements is that directors
must receive a majority of all votes cast. Unlike the traditional
rule that a director is elected by plurality vote, the majority
requirement would give shareholders a greater power to prevent
the election of undesirable candidates.131 Velasco also
recommends the elimination of staggered boards of directors.132
In that system directors have multi-year terms and are
classified so that they do not all stand for election every year.
Annual election of directors, by contrast makes them less
entrenched and more accountable to shareholders. It might also
remove a deterrent to a tender offer that could return increased
value to shareholders. A potential bidder then would not be put
off by having to wait more than a year to gain control of a board
once she has achieved majority stock ownership.
Along those lines, Velasco points out that corporate law
is mostly geared toward enabling a firm’s activity and does not
Id. at 614.
See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
129 See Velasco, supra note 120, at 677.
130 Id. at 641-61. Since derivative suits are equitable in nature, the Court has
broad discretion in granting relief. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT & DAVID F. CAVERS,
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.6 (2013); see also generally
Bert S. Prunty, The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 980 (1957); see, e.g., In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 780 F. Supp. 2d
336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (approving a settlement involving the creation of a new board-level
regulatory committee); see also Memorandum of Understanding, In re News Corp.
S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 6285 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2013), available at
http://www.newscorpderivativesettlement.com/pdf/mou.pdf; In re Johnson & Johnson
Derivative Litig., 900 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D.N.J. 2012) (containing significant provisions
geared to enhance board-level responsibility for legal and regulatory compliance).
131 In 2012, directors at 41 public companies failed to gain 50% shareholder
approval for their reelection, yet they have remained in office. James B. Stewart, When
Shareholder Democracy is Sham Democracy, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, at B1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/business/sham-shareholder-democracy.html.
132 Velasco, supra note 120, at 647.
127
128
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mandate its substantive conduct.133 The statutory rules for
corporate governance therefore are only default provisions and
can be changed.134 In that regard he points to shareholder
initiated reforms that more corporations are accepting such as
the requirement that each director be elected by a majority of
the shareholders.135
Professor Velasco also notes the increasing dominance
of institutional shareholders with large holdings in particular
stocks.136 He sees that as a likely counterweight to traditional
shareholder apathy.137 He also dismisses an argument which is
often made to deprecate the legitimate rights of shareholders—
that stockholders will only use their power opportunistically to
advance their own interests.138
Two well-known corporate authorities, Chancellor Leo
139
Strine
and Professor Steven Bainbridge,140 have recently
asserted that position, arguing that stockholders often have
viewpoints that are inconsistent with the long-term best
interests of their corporations.
Professor George Dent, however, goes even further than
Velasco in refuting that often-made case against shareholder
empowerment. He contends that those misgivings are
exaggerated and have no empirical basis.141 For the most part,
shareholders are not short-term oriented but instead want their
officers to maximize the long-term value of their firms. 142
Dent also convincingly asserts that shareholder choices
are entitled to respect in the same manner as those of voters in
a political democracy. Citizens may not be capable of statecraft,
but they are appropriately given the power to elect those who
will run their government. By the same logic, shareholders
should be able to choose directors to manage the companies
that they own. There is no reason that enhanced federal
regulation could not further the goal of shareholder democracy
See Velasco, supra note 120, at 656.
Id. at 656 n.250.
135 Id. at 643.
136 Id. at 623, 628.
137 Id. at 622-24.
138 Id. at 635-37.
139 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1759, 1769-70 (2006). At the time of the writing of this piece Leo Strine held the office
of Vice-Chancellor, but was subsequently appointed the Chief Justice of Delaware.
140 Stephen
M.
Bainbridge,
Director
Primacy
and
Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1735-37, 1745, 1749-51 (2006).
141 Dent, supra note 117, at 122-28.
142 Id.
133

134
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and empowerment as well as mandate that corporations act in
a socially responsible manner.
B.

Hopeful Signs of Shareholder Activism

The need for greater accountability by corporate officials
is a compelling objective. There have to be effective checks on
their innate tendencies to enrich themselves at the expense of
various corporate constituents and society itself. Investigations
after the Watergate scandal revealed a widespread pattern of
illegal campaign contributions and other improper activity by a
large number of major corporations.143 In response, the SEC
began demanding more disclosure of the composition and
workings of public boards.144 The American Law Institute
followed suit with a 16-year project that culminated in its
“Principles of Corporate Governance.”145 It included “good
practice” guidelines for the make-up and operation of boards.146
Then, after the dot-com bubble burst at the turn of the
century, prominent financial frauds like Enron and WorldCom
came to light.147 They resulted in the loss of billions of dollars of
shareholder wealth and precipitated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, creating stringent requirements for disclosures about the
governance practices of public corporations.148 The required
disclosures included whether the firms had watchdog board
committees to oversee audits, executive compensation, and the
nomination of new directors.149 The Act also demanded
transparency about whether the directors on those panels were
independent from the top executives of their companies.150 The
major stock exchanges soon followed with their own

143 See M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Déjà vu All Over Again”: Using Bounty
Hunters to Leverage Gate Keeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419, 427 (2009).
144 See GEVURTZ, supra note 71, at 241.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 For two good books about the Enron scandal, see generally BETHANY
MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); REBECCA SMITH & JOHN R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS:
HOW TWO WALL STREET JOURNAL REPORTERS UNCOVERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED
FAITH IN CORPORATE AMERICA (2003). For a good description of the WorldCom
accounting fraud, see Peter Elstrom, How to Hide $3.8 billion in Expenses, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 27, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-06-27/howto-hide-3-dot-8-billion-in-expenses.
148 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. (2002)).
149 Id. at § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f).
150 Id.
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“independence” standards for the boards of companies whose
shares are listed there.151
The newly required disclosures were geared towards
making the leaders of public companies more accountable to
their shareholders and the public. Sadly, they did little to stop
the devastating financial meltdown of 2008. As one
commentator observed after, “The recent financial crisis makes
clear that the directors and officers of public corporations have
not internalized Enron’s lessons.”152
Congress responded with more legislation, DoddFrank,153 that, among other things, provided additional
requirement for shareholder participation in governance. The
law requires disclosure about situations where the same
individual is both CEO and Chair of the Board154 and, with its
“Say-on-Pay” provision, also gave shareholders an advisory
vote on executive compensation.155
Shareholders are increasingly involved in movements to
challenge traditional corporate goals. When he points out the
entrenchment of wealth perpetuated through the traditional
corporate structure, Carl Ichan, a major investor and shareholder
activist, puts it bluntly, “[I]n the middle ages, feudal lords
asserted the ‘divine right’ of royalty to justify their lordly positions
while plundering the peasants. Today’s boards act like they are
vested with similar powers.”156 Ichan then notes how formerly
disconnected shareholders can be united by social media and
other communication tools and he pledges to use them “to make
more shareholders aware of their rights and what can be done to
keep those rights from being trampled on.”157 Other shareholder
activists have put out similar calls for unified action.158
151
152

137 (2011).

GEVURTZ, supra note 71, at 242.
Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

153 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections throughout the U.S.C.
(2010)); see generally Daniel Morrissey, Reining in Wall Street: Dodd-Frank Provides a
Needed Mechanism to Bridle the Animal Spirits that Drive the Financial Community,
NAT’L L. J OPINION (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202471121556/
Reining-in-Wall-Street?slreturn=20150205135812.
154 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 972.
155 See id. § 951.
156 Icahn, supra note 70, at 1.
157 Id.
158 These efforts appear to be bearing fruit as some boards are inviting activist
shareholders to join them as directors. David Benoit, Companies, Activists Declare
Truce in Boardroom Battles: Corporate Executives, Directors Find it Cheaper to
Negotiate than Fight, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579248501076906672.
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John Liu, New York City’s comptroller oversees the city’s
pension funds that own a large stake in Cablevision.159
Expressing outrage at directors who lost elections but remained
on the company’s board Liu said, “As fiduciaries, we can’t sit by
and let the board make a mockery of our fundamental right to
elect directors.”160 He urged a proxy fight against such “zombie
directors,” stating, “Share owners need accountable directors
who will ensure the company isn’t being run for the benefit of
insiders at our expense.”161
Activist stockholders are also becoming effective at
controlling excessive executive compensation. Approximately
128,000 shareholders of Verizon who are retirees of its
predecessor companies achieved a partial victory last year
when the company agreed to cut back performance-based stock
awards for its officials if Verizon’s stock does not do well.162 The
group has also moved against any severance awards at the
company that are more than three times the retiring officers’
base pay and incentives. 163 In similar fashion, investment
officers at the California State Teachers’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) are questioning peer group standards for executive
pay that are out of line with compensation paid at truly
comparable companies.164 Activist stockholders are also using
the shareholder proposal mechanism in the federal securities
laws165 to prod their companies to undertake socially
responsible activities. In 2014, 56% of shareholder proposals
concerned environmental and social issues.166

Stewart, supra note 131, at 1.
Id.
161 Id.
162 Gretchen Morgenson, As Shareholders Say ‘Enough Already,’ Some Boards Are
Starting to Listen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2013, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/04/07/business/shareholders-can-slow-the-executive-pay-express.html.
163 Id.
164 See Gretchen Morgenson, A Better Way to Compare C.E.O. Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2013, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/
business/a-better-way-to-compare-ceo-pay.html.
165 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012).
166 Emily Chasan, More Companies Bow to Investors With a Social Cause, THE
CFO REPORT: WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2014, 2:44 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2014/04/01/
more-companies-bow-to-investors-with-a-social-cause/.
159

160
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A.

CSR at the Close of the Century
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In a famous address delivered in 1992, Chancellor Allen
acknowledged how “turbulent” the 1980s had been for
corporate law.167 Two different and contradictory approaches to
a corporation’s raison d’etre, he said, had peacefully co-existed
for decades.168 One which he called the “property conception”
was premised on shareholder primacy and held that the board’s
paramount duty was to maximize profits.169 The other, which
he labeled the “social entity conception,” charged the
corporation with broader obligations.170 This conflict, he said,
had been “papered over”171 by the general acceptance that
corporate philanthropy could be justified as being in the long
term best interest of the firm and its shareholders.
Such an approach, said the Chancellor, had worked when
American companies were free from global competition and
impervious to hostile take-overs.172 The dynamic world economy
and the rise of tender offers, however, had exposed the
inconsistencies of that position and forced the law to grapple
with issues pitting CSR against shareholder value. Courts, he
said, were hardly eager to decide those questions because there
was “no widely accepted doctrine [that] offered a clear guide.”173
With landmark decisions like Paramount Pictures,174
Allen said, the Courts had punted the problem back to corporate
boards.175 Conscientious directors now have to grapple with
them.176 It all comes down, the Chancellor wisely observed, to a
fundamental clash between one notion of corporations as

167 William
T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 263 (1992). As one commentator said of
Chancellor Allen’s particular expertise, “Especially during the late 1980s and early
1990s, when Chancellor Allen was deciding cases, the Delaware Court of Chancery was
the center of the corporate law universe.” D. Gordon Smith, Chancellor Allen and the
Fundamental Question, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577, 578 (1998).
168 Allen, supra note 167, at 264-65.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 272.
172 Id. at 266.
173 Id. at 275.
174 See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935,
1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff ’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (unpublished).
175 See Allen, supra note 167, at 276.
176 See id.
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economic and financial entities as opposed to another which sees
them as institutions of political and social significance.177
As most Americans experienced increasing economic
insecurity during the latter part of the twentieth century,178
advocates for CSR became even more forceful. Accelerating
ecological concerns contributed to its increasing prominence as
well. It was thus in the early 1990s that a well-known
environmentalist, John Elkington, coined the term “triplebottom-line.”179 It succinctly asserted that in a system of
sustainable capitalism a corporation’s profit-making goals had
to be both eco-friendly and tempered by a commitment to a fair
distribution of the world’s resources.180
A report from the John F. Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard aptly described how different movements were then
coalescing in this drive for an enhanced corporate mandate.181 It
found that reformers were demanding corporations serve not
just their shareholders’ interests for financial gain but also
attend to the needs of their employees, consumers,
communities, and society as a whole.182 The report described
these varied efforts in this fashion:
The term [CSR] is often used interchangeably with corporate
responsibility, corporate citizenship, social enterprise, sustainability,
Id. at 264-65.
This is perhaps the most pressing problem facing the United States and
has been written extensively about in Morrissey, supra note 70. Among the many fine
studies on this important issue, HEDRICK SMITH, WHO STOLE THE AMERICAN DREAM
(2012) is one the best. As the author there wrote of that disturbing trend which began
in the late 1970s:
177
178

The soaring wealth of the super-rich has brought the unraveling of the
American Dream for the middle class—the dream of a steady job with decent
pay and health benefits, rising living standards, a home of your own, a secure
retirement, and the hope that your children would enjoy a better future.
Id. at xvi. The harmful psychological effect of this insecurity on American workers is
described in a series of articles that appeared in the September/October 2013 issue of
AMERICAN PROSPECT under the apt title, Work in the Age of Anxiety. The lead piece
presents the effects of the decline in real wages since 1974. See generally Harold
Meyerson, The Forty-Year Slump, in AMERICAN PROSPECT: WORK IN THE AGE OF
ANXIETY (Sept./Oct. 2013), available at http://prospect.org/article/40-year-slump. The
impact of this poor compensation on workers’ commitments to their jobs is predictable.
The Gallup poll reports that “52% of workers are mentally ‘checked out’ and an
additional 18% are actively disengaged.” John Stancavage, A Cure for Workplace Zombies
is Possible, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 11, 2013 at E1, available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/
business/john-stancavage-managers-need-to-find-a-cure-for-workplace/article_0546d971aead-55a8-aca4-37ce3456d158.html.
179 MICHAEL KERR ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 24 (2009).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 7-8.
182 Id.
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sustainable development, triple-bottom line, corporate ethics, and in
some cases corporate governance. Though these terms are different,
they all point in the same direction: throughout the industrialized
world and in many developing countries there has been a sharp
escalation in the social roles corporations are expected to play.183

Thus, increased tension between the shareholder’s goal
to maximize profit and the increasing concern and awareness
of the need for socially responsible corporations is begging for a
solution. One is for a uniform federal regulation of corporations
that would establish such a mandate.
B.

CSR Today

In the years since the twenty-first century began, the push
for CSR has continued to gain momentum. The phenomenon is
attributable at least in part to the global rise of social and
environmental awareness that quite naturally focuses on
corporate behavior. For instance, business was first made
responsible for making development sustainable at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The follow-up conference held in
Johannesburg 10 years later not only re-enforced CSR goals of
the prior conference but called for “continuous improvement in
corporate practices” to achieve it.184 The United Nations
continued this momentum with another environmental
conference in New York City in September 2014.
Such agendas are fostered by concerned groups that
have sprung up over the last several decades to address social
ills. There are now thousands of these non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and many of them focus on activities by
business, especially those that operate on a world-wide scale.
Their attention is on labor, environmental, and human rights
issues and those that involve corrupt conduct. CorpWatch, an
American organization, is a good example. Its mission is “to
expose multinational corporations that profit from war, fraud,
environmental, human rights and other abuses, and to provide
critical information to foster a more informed public and an
effective democracy.”185 Even an editorially conservative

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 18-19.
185 About CorpWatch, CORP WATCH, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=
11314 (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
183
184
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newspaper like the Wall Street Journal has continued to focus
on these corporate abusers.186
Such activity has engendered a favorable response from
business. A majority of Fortune 500 companies now publish a
CSR or sustainability report, a significant increase from the
small handful that did so 10 years ago.187 Internationally the
result is much the same.188
Many of these moves have been initiated by business
leaders themselves. In a famous speech at the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland in 2008, Bill Gates called for a
new system of “creative capitalism” to tackle problems like the
eradication of malaria.189 To that end Gates later wrote, “It is
mainly corporations that have the skills to make technological
innovations work for the poor. To make the most of those skills,
we [must] stretch the reach of market forces so that more
companies can benefit from doing work that makes more people
better off.”190
In that vein, John Mackey, the president of Whole Foods,
has recently co-authored a book called Conscious Capitalism:
Liberating the Heroic Spirit of Business.191 As its title states,
Mackey believes most business people are motivated not just to
make profit but at least in part to do good for others.192 Mackey
and Gates’s efforts are two prime examples of what some have
called, “[p]hilanthrocapitalism . . . a more self-consciously
innovative and entrepreneurial effort to tackle the world’s most
urgent social problems.”193
186 See, e.g., Eva Dou, China’s Tech Factories Turn to Student Labor, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 25, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-tech-factories-turn-to-studentlabor-1411572448.
187 Knowledge@Wharton, Why Companies Can No Longer Afford to Ignore
Their Social Responsibilities, TIME.COM (May 28, 2012), http://business.time.com/
2012/05/28/why-companies-can-no-longer-afford-to-ignore-their-social-responsibilities/.
188 Approximately “seventy percent of the companies listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange” now issue such reports annually. Craig Kielburger & Marc Kielburger, The
Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/craig-kielburger-and-marc-kielburger/the-rise-ofcorporate-soc_b_85395.html. More than 8,000 businesses world-wide have signed on to
the UN Global Compact promising responsible action in the areas of human rights, labor
standards, and environmental protection. See Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 187.
189 Bill Gates, Chairman, Microsoft Corp., A New Approach to Capitalism in
the 21st Century, Address at the World Economic Forum (Jan. 24, 2008), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ql-Mtlx31e8.
190 Bill Gates & Barbara Kiviat, Making Capitalism More Creative, TIME (July
31, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1828417,00.html.
191 JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING THE
HEROIC SPIRIT OF BUSINESS (2013).
192 See id.
193 Chrystia Freeland, Plutocrats vs. Populists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2013, at SR1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/opinion/sunday/plutocrats-vs-populists.html.
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Those nobler purposes should be specifically
acknowledged, says Mackey, and business should therefore take
into account the interests of all their stakeholders, like their
employees and the communities that they serve.194 The founders
of Google professed a similar commitment to the common good
in their prospectus when the company went public in 2004
stating, “We believe strongly that in the long term, we will be
better served—as shareholders and in all other ways—by a
company that does good things for the world even if we forgo
short term gains.”195
Such sentiments resonate with the public at large.
Approximately 77% of consumers now say it is important for
business to be socially responsible196 and 50% of them take that
into consideration when they buy things.197 Such concerns are even
stronger among young people. Approximately 85% of them say they
are interested in how corporations act198 and 70% of Millennials,
those ages 18 to 26, tell opinion researches that they want to work
at a company that is dedicated to improving its community.199
Religious leaders and public intellectuals have also
given CSR momentum. Pope Francis made this forceful
statement in his November 2013 Apostolic Exhortation, “How
can it be that it is not a news item when an elderly homeless
person dies of exposure, but it is news when the stock market
loses two points?”200 In addition he criticized those who defend
unfettered laissez-faire capitalism with these pointed remarks:
194 See Alan Murray, Chicken Soup For a Davos Soul: Successful Companies
Serve a Purpose Beyond Making Money, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2013, 4:46 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324235104578243673073627726
(reviewing MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 191).
195 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter: “An Owner’s Manuel” for Google’s Shareholders,
GOOGLE, https://investor.google.com/corporate/2004/ipo-founders-letter.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2015).
196 Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 187; see also David Brooks, How to Leave
a Mark, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/opinion/davidbrooks-how-to-leave-a-mark.html?_r=1 (discussing the recent mainstream emergence
of “impact investing” where investors “seek out companies that are intentionally
designed both to make a profit and provide a measurable and accountable social good”).
197 Kielburger, supra note 188.
198 Id.
199 Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 187. Another survey cited in an article in
the editorially conservative Wall Street Journal found that 61% of those responding
want corporate leaders to help solve social problems and 59% want them to be
responsible for the welfare of their employees. Donald A. Baer, The West’s Bruised
Confidence in Capitalism, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/
donald-baer-the-wests-bruised-confidence-in-capitalism-1411358403.
200 VATICAN PRESS, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION EVANGELII GAUDIUM OF THE HOLY
FATHER FRANCIS TO THE BISHOPS, CLERGY, CONSECRATED PERSONS AND THE LAY
FAITHFUL OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE GOSPEL IN TODAY’S WORLD 45 (2013), available
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Some people continue to defend trickle-down theories which assume
that economic growth, encouraged by a free market, will inevitably
succeed in bringing about greater justice and inclusiveness in the
world. This opinion, which has never been confirmed by the facts,
expresses a crude and naïve trust in the goodness of those wielding
economic power and in the sacralized workings of the prevailing
economic system.201

The 2012 presidential election even served as a
referendum of sorts on this outlook. Republican presidential
candidate Mitt Romney had made a large fortune at Bain capital,
a firm that specialized in financing corporate restructuring that
displaced many workers and hurt local communities. As one
commentator said, it was a “cutthroat form of capitalism . . . [that]
sent unheard-of profits toward the prosperous few while
threatening the jobs and eroding the wages of the rest.”202
President Obama made an issue of Romney’s business
background, especially in key battle ground states like Michigan
and Ohio that he carried on the way to his reelection.203
If the CSR movement is not yet the dominant theme in
business, it has at least become an important one. Even its
critics attest to that. As Clive Crook, the then deputy editor of
The Economist acknowledged in 2005, “[t]he movement for
corporate social responsibility has won the battle of
ideas . . . CSR commands the attention of executives
everywhere . . . and it would be a challenge to find a recent
annual report of any big international company that justifies
the firm’s existence merely in terms of profits rather than
service to the community.”204
Part of that surge in support may be attributable to the
self-interest of business itself that recognizes the goodwill it

at
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papafrancesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html (click “Download PDF”).
201 Id. at 46. For a similar take from a leading American philosopher who has
advocated our collective responsibilities to one another, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT
MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 6-11 (2012).
202 Eduardo Porter, At the Polls Choose Your Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/business/choose-yourcapitalism.html.
203 George Will, Status Quo Preserved in U.S. Politics, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 9,
2012, at A20; see also Sabrina Siddiqui, Mitt Romney Wants Business Record Removed from
Obama Campaign Attacks, HUFFPOST POLITICS (Aug. 10, 2012, 4:41 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/romney-business-record-attack-ads_n_
1765601.html.
204 KERR, supra note 179, at 33.
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can generate from this socially responsible activity205 or
conversely the ill-will that can come from its neglect. Two
recent examples are the devastating BP oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico206 and the horrible fires and sweat-shop conditions in
Bangladesh factories that make clothes sold by U.S. retailers.207
Along those lines, many businesses have also profited by
cost savings resulting from changes designed to benefit the
environment. Dow Chemical is a good illustration of that.208
Likewise companies like Gap, Inc. are proud to boast how their
employee friendly policies have led to increased profitability.209
As the company stated in its 2005-06 Social Responsibility
Report, “[w]hen factories treat workers well, they also tend to
produce higher-quality product and deliver it on time. The more
we respect and empower our own employees, the more creative
and innovative our products and marketing tend to be.”210
Institutional investors have led the way here too.
CalPERS with its $264 billion fund, has identified 111
205 See Mark Pfitzer et al., Innovating for Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept. 2013, at 101; Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society, The
Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS.
REV., Dec. 2006, at 78; see also JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE PRICE OF CIVILIZATION 42-48
(2011) (arguing the efficiency and fairness may reinforce each other); Forest L.
Reinhardt et al., Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens, 2 REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 152 (2008) (questioning whether CSR requires companies to
sacrifice profits).
206 Jeffrey Hollender, co-founder of the American Sustainable Business
Council and the Sustainability Institute had these harsh words for BP’s
shortsightedness in 2010:

If British Petroleum was an authentically responsible corporation, would the
Gulf be in the mess it is now . . . . An oil company driven by a mission of
genuine responsibility would have voluntarily installed the non-required
safety gear . . . . Yes these things can take money. An automatic switch that
closes off the blowouts, for example, runs about $500,000. But compared to
the $30 billion drop in market value of BP stock has experienced since the
spill, not to mention what it might cost to clean up the entire Gulf, that’s a
drop in the bucket.
Gerald Milward-Oliver, The Soul of the Corporation, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 91, at 77-78.
207 See Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Bangladesh Finds Gross Negligence
in Factory Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/
world/asia/bangladesh-factory-fire-caused-by-gross-negligence.html
(describing
a
November 24, 2012 fire, in which 112 workers lost their lives at the Tazreen Fashion
Factory, which made clothing for global retailers like Walmart and Sears); see also
Mark Anner et al., Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing the
Root Causes of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2013).
208 Because of energy reducing initiatives, Dow Chemical said in 2004 that it
had achieved approximately $3 billion in savings. KERR, supra note 179, at 42.
209 Id.
210 Id.
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initiatives that focus on issues such as green energy and
regions that are “‘underserved’ by investment capital.”211 In
addition, a new surge of student activism with roots in the
1960s anti-war protests and the 1980s movement to end
apartheid has been agitating on-campus, calling on universities
to divest their holdings in fossil fuel companies.212
All these undertakings have been substantially assisted
by the rise of social media that can link people immediately in
ways never before imagined. As one observer put it so well:
The billions of cell phones in the world will increasingly be used to
record, upload, forward, and display corporate and other abuses,
whether of sweatshops employing child labor, pipeline leaks,
trafficking of women and children, or corporate resources [being]
used to support crimes against humanity or genocide . . . . These
new, powerful, ubiquitous, and interactive communication
technologies . . . empower
rapid,
bottom-up
democratic
“WikiAdvocacy” by individuals, “citizen journalists” bloggers, and
self-organiz[ed] coalitions, while simultaneously allowing greater
scrutiny and pressure from investors, consumers, communities,
established NGOs, and other market monitors.213

C.

CSR’s Increased Sophistication

As it has grown in strength and influence, the CSR
movement has sharpened the theories that support its agenda.
Two major themes now stand out. First, corporations must
combine their profit making efforts with environmental and social
concerns. Second, they must give appropriate consideration to the
interests of all their stakeholders.214 In doing this, companies
must go beyond minimal legal requirements and conventional

211 Randall Smith, A New Divestment Program Focus on Campus: Fossil Fuels,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 5, 2013, 3:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
09/05/a-new-divestment-focus-fossil-fuels/.
212 Christen Graham, From Campus Protests to Your Retirement Fund, How
Divesting from Fossil Fuels and Investing in ESGs Work, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar.
18, 2013), http://changeup.bangordailynews.com/2013/03/18/social-responsibility/fromcampus-protests-to-your-retirement-fund-how-divesting-from-fossil-fuels-and-investingin-esgs-work/.
213 Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and
Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 334, 336 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
214 KERR, supra note 179, at 11-12. But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 31 (U.S. June 30, 2014), where the Supreme Court ruled
that the owners of a closely-held corporation did not have to consider the wishes of
their employees when they refused on religious grounds to offer them health insurance
with certain forms of birth control required by the Affordable Care Act.
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philanthropy215 and stake out positive commitments to these
broader concerns.216
Books and articles on these topics now abound and with
their proliferation have come new ideas about how companies
can balance profit with larger principles.217 In the school of
Progressive Corporate Law, American professors Lawrence
Mitchell218 and Douglas Branson219 have led the way and
Canadian legal scholar Joel Balkan has made a significant
contribution with his work, The Corporation: The Pathological
Pursuit of Profit and Power. Though Balkan acknowledged that
a corporation is a “remarkably efficient wealth-creating
machine” he argued that it should be committed to social welfare
as well as profit.220 “Though individualistic self-interest and
consumer desires are core parts of who we are and nothing to be
ashamed about,” he wrote, “they are not all of who we are.”221
By extension the ethical mandate which applies to each person
should therefore also control the actions of such significant
human institutions as corporations.
Part of the theory supporting CSR has also targeted
short-termism, which pushes corporations to externalize the
costs of their demand for quick profits on the rest of society.
This can take the form of worker mistreatment, environmental
pollution, and a general failure to provide for the sustainability
of the enterprise.222 There is an obvious overlap between
corporate governance and CSR.223

215 Chris Howells, When it Comes to CSR, Size Matters, FORBES.COM (Aug. 14,
2013, 2:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insead/2013/08/14/when-it-comes-to-csrsize-matters/.
216 Greg Hills et al., Anti-Corruption as Strategic CSR: A Call to Action for
Corporations, FSG SOCIAL IMPACT ADVISORS, May 2009, at 2.
217 See KERR, supra note 179; CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 91; DOREEN MCBARNET ET
AL., THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE LAW 282-83 (2007); MARES, supra note 93.
218 See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995).
219 DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1993).
220 JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT
AND POWER 159 (2004).
221 Id. at 166.
222 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, The Board as a Path to Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW, supra note 217.
223 Mark Walsh & John Lowry, CSR and Corporate Governance, in
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST
CENTURY , supra note 91, at 45.
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It is ultimately up to the board to be the corporate
conscience and restrain this short-sightedness.224 The business
judgment rule, which affords directors discretion in running a
corporation, gives them legal support to follow such a balanced
approach.225 Chancellor Allen explained the justification for
that deference with these comments, “Resolving the often
conflicting claims of these various corporate constituencies
calls for judgment, indeed calls for wisdom, by the board of
directors of the corporation.”226
As another commentator put it:
In recent years, a growing number of public companies have come to
recognize that sustainable corporate profit does not result from the
single-minded pursuit of financial gain. Rather sustainable growth
and shareholder value are best achieved by working through a broad
framework of economic, social, environmental and ethical values and
shared objectives that involve constant interaction between the
company and its various stakeholders.227

In much the same vein, CSR theorists have been
increasingly focusing a more direct attack on Milton Friedman’s
classic one dimensional definition of corporate purpose—to only
maximize profits for shareholders.228 McBarnet pointed out that
as opposed to the holistic response of CSR, Friedman’s view
represented “the atomising perspective of the traditional
individualist approach.”229 Another picked up on Friedman’s
concession that corporations should obey laws and “ethical
custom.”230 Since social responsibility is certainly a moral norm for
individuals, why shouldn’t it also be one for corporate citizens?231
In Mitt Romney’s famous dictum, “corporations are people.”232

224 See generally Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John R. Matthews, Jr., Can a
Corporation Have a Conscience? 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 132 (1982).
225 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
226 Allen, supra note 167, at 271.
227 ROSELLE, supra note 91, at 129.
228 See Friedman, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
229 AURORA
VOICULESCU, Changing Paradigms of Corporate Criminal
Responsibility: Lessons for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSBILITY AND THE LAW, supra note 217, at 416.
230 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 17.
231 KERR, supra note 179, at 53-54.
232 Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney says ‘Corporations are People’, WASH. POST (Aug.
11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-says-corporations-arepeople/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ38I_story.html. In two landmark cases the Supreme Court
has recently ruled that corporations can be seen as moral agents with rights to free
speech and free exercise of religion. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354
(U.S. June 30, 2014); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n 558 U.S, 10 (2010);
see generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797).
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Leading corporate scholars like Hillary Sale and
Margaret Stout have also written of this communal notion of
corporate identity. Sale points out that the adjective “public,”
which modifies large companies with many shareholders,
implies that those firms should serve all people in a society.233
Stout’s concept of the corporation as a “team,” which connotes
that it needs the talents of many players to make it successful,
also speaks to the broader ideas that underlie CSR theory.234
In addition, the rise of a new legal form that a business
may take, the “Benefit” or “B” corporation, addresses those
aspirations even more directly. Such a company may state in
its charter that in addition to making profit it may engage in
less remunerative activity that will produce social good. Such
an innovation is in line with diverse approaches to corporate
governance taken in other countries.235
One prominent and successful example of that is the
Workers’ Councils of Germany. They collaborate with
management in that highly productive and prosperous country
and lead their firms to embrace broad social goals.236 Such a
new corporate model might even have some resonance with the
state capitalism of China where a new generation of leaders
speaks openly of the need to pay better wages to factory
workers so they can afford to buy the products they make.237
The rapid growth of the CSR movement during the last several
decades can be explained, at least in part, as a response to the
See Sale, supra note 152, at 1.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 275-76. This “team” concept of the
corporation, however, received a set-back in the recent Hobby Lobby case. There the
Supreme Court held that the owners of a closely-held corporation did not have to
consider the wishes of their employees when they refused on religious grounds to offer
them health insurance with certain forms of birth control required by the Affordable
Care Act. Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 31.
235 See
generally Christopher Lacovara, Strange Creatures: A Hybrid
Approach to Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 815
(2011); Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987 (2009). The author there
cleverly parodied Gordon Gekko’s notorious “Greed is Good” speech to the board of a
paper producing company, in this fashion: “The point is, ladies and gentlemen, that
green, for lack of a better work, is good. Green is right. Green works. Green clarifies,
cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Green in all of its
forms—green for life, for money, for love, knowledge—has marked the upward surge of
mankind. And green, you mark my words, will not only save Teldar Paper, but that
other malfunctioning corporation called the U.S.A.” Id. at 989.
236 For a fine book that makes this point while discussing the disadvantages
American workers face in comparison with their much better off German counterparts,
see THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WERE YOU BORN ON THE WRONG CONTINENT?: HOW THE
EUROPEAN MODEL CAN HELP YOU GET A LIFE (2010).
237 James Fallows, Mr. China Comes to America, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/12/mr-china-comes-to-america/309160/.
233

234
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increasing disparity in income and wealth among Americans.
In the decades after World War II, most firms in our country
paid high wages. That in turn led to robust consumer spending
that spurred the economy to even more productivity. Such
widely shared affluence thus engendered a virtuous cycle of
strong business activity.238
Yet despite significant gains in productivity over the
last thirty years, wage growth has been stagnant.239 During
that time, technology and globalization240 have destroyed many
manufacturing and clerical jobs in this country—leaving
behind only poorly paying service jobs.241 By contrast, those in
the upper echelons of society, principally financiers and
executives, have grown ever richer.242
238 See Jordan Weismann, 60 Years of American Economic History, Told in 1
Graph, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2012/08/60-years-of-american-economic-history-told-in-1-graph/261503.
As Hedrick Smith writes of that era: “In the heyday of the middle class, for thirty years
after World War II, America’s great companies paid high wages and good benefits.
Tens of millions of families had steady income, and they spent it, generating high
consumer demand.” SMITH, supra note 178, at xxiv. Robert Reich’s recent movie,
INEQUALITY FOR ALL (72 Productions 2013), contrasts that era of widespread prosperity
to the current time when the disparities in income have grown to alarming proportions.
It was favorably reviewed by Nicolas Rapold, Chasm Between the Very Rich and
Everybody Else, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2013, at C16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/27/movies/robert-reich-stars-in-the-documentary-inequality-for-all.html.
239 William A. Galston, Behind the Middle-Class Funk, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2013,
6:29 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324653004578650460173879732.
This is so even while American workers are more productive than those in European
countries. Discussing the substantial wealth increase in America during the last
several decades, Thomas Geoghegan writes: “Technically we seem far ahead, but don’t
drool. The U.S. superrich gobble well over two-thirds of the increase. In 2005, the real
hourly wage for production workers in America was approximately eight percent lower
than it was in 1973, while our national output per hour is 55 percent higher. So it’s
dubious whether most Americans have gained even a penny in purchasing power since
1989.” GEOGHEGAN, supra note 236, at 13.
240 Nobel-prize-winning economist Joseph E. Stiglitz aptly described this
phenomenon. “[L]aborsaving technologies have reduced the demand for many “good”
middle-class, blue-collar jobs. Globalization has created a worldwide marketplace,
pitting expensive, unskilled workers in America against cheap unskilled workers
overseas. Social changes have also played a role—for instance, the decline of unions,
which once represented a third of American workers and now represent about 12
percent.” Joseph E. Sitglitz, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%, VANITY FAIR (May, 2011),
http://www.vanityfair.com/society/features/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105.
241 In an earlier piece, the author has marshalled a number of statistical
measurements to substantiate this income inequality and wealth concentration.
Morrissey, supra note 70, at 4-8.
242 Morrissey, supra note 70, at 13-16. In the last two years, despite
substantial criticism of exorbitant corporate compensation, the pay of top executives
has continued to soar. See Gretchen Morgenson, The Unstoppable Climb in C.E.O. Pay,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2013, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/
30/business/an-unstoppable-climb-in-ceo-pay.html; Nelson D. Schwartz, The Infinity Pool
of Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2013, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/04/07/business/executive-pay-shows-modest-2012-gain-but-oh-those-perks.html.
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The gap between the wealthiest Americans and almost
everyone else has continued to accelerate.243 Even worse, this
general decline in the American economy was masked by an
illusory prosperity. It came first in a run-up of high-tech dotcom stocks,244 and then in a surge in real estate prices. When
the latter bubble finally burst in 2008 it brought on the worst
financial panic since 1929.245
Thanks to fiscal and monetary bailouts by the federal
government, the nation avoided a depression and the stock
market rebounded, soaring again to new heights.246 Yet hardly
any of that “created” money trickled down to middle income
Americans who work for wages. Statistics continue to pour out
showing that the gap between the wealthiest Americans and
almost everyone else keeps growing. Last year, for instance,
the richest 10 percent got over one-half the income our country
produced.247 Even recent job gains that have come as the
country has slowly emerged from this great recession have
been almost entirely in the low-paid service and retail
sectors.248 Another recent report states that the real income of
middle class Americans has declined by 8% since the Great
Recession began in 2007.249 As one commentator sadly put it,
“we have become a nation of hamburger flippers.”250
That very troubling trend is best exemplified by the
disparity between the pay of top corporate officials and that of
243 Even conservatives are acknowledging this growing income inequality,
while blaming it on government policies. See David Malpass, How Big Government
Drives Inequality: Stifling Economic Growth and Benefiting Insiders with Washington
Access Do Not Help the Middle Class, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702303848104579312422581164580.
244 The 1990s saw astounding gains in the stock market. The Dow Jones
Industrial Average increased from 2753.20 to 11224.70 and the NASDAQ went from 454.82
to 3620.24. Rollicking, Rocketing Stock Markets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1999 at C1, C23.
245 For the author’s take on the meltdown and its impact on the economy see
Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Meltdown, 45 TULSA L. REV. 393, 393-97 (2009).
246 The stock market had its best year in 2013 since 1997. The Standard and
Poor’s 500 Stock index rose 29.6%. Adam Shell, Stocks End Red-Hot 2013 at All-Time
Highs, USA TODAY (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
markets/2013/12/31/stocks-soar-in-2013/4204327/.
247 Lowrey, supra note 60.
248 Ross D. Franklin, New Jobs Disproportionately Low-pay, Part-time, NEWSJOURNAL.COM (Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.news-journal.com/news/nation/new-jobsdisproportionately-low-pay-part-time/article_10536eec-5421-5db4-86b2-cc8a29158a47.html.
249 Rakesh Kochhar and Rich Morin, Despite Recovery, Fewer Americans Identify
as Middle Class, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, available at http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/01/27/despite-recovery-fewer-americans-identify-as-middle-class/.
250 Aaron Task, “We Have Become a Nation of Hamburger Flippers”: Dan
Alpert Breaks Down the Jobs Report, THE DAILY TICKER (Aug. 2, 2013, 10:58 AM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/become-nation-hamburger-flippers-danalpert-breaks-down-145831220.html.
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average workers. In 1965 it was 24 to one, but by 2010 at the
300 largest companies it had sky-rocketed to 343 to one.251 The
discontent spawned by that huge inequality is evident in the
Occupy Wall Street movement.252 As one union official said in
endorsing those work stoppages, “We think it’s important to
back low-wage workers who are willing to stand up and have
the courage to strike to make the case that the economy is
creating jobs that people can’t support their families on.”253
All this has had a real effect on our social fabric,
particularly the promise of upward mobility that generations of
Americans have taken for granted which is now vanishing.254
As the renowned social historian Francis Fukuyama has
recently stated,
The fact is, however, that rates of intergenerational social mobility
are far lower in the United States than many Americans believe
them to be . . . .Over time elites are able to protect their positions by
gaming the political system, moving their money off-shore to avoid
taxation, and transmitting these advantages to their children
through favored access to elite institutions.255

Another author made much the same point, saying,
“Most of Western Europe today is both more equal in incomes
and more economically mobile than the United States.”256 More
and more Americans are becoming aware of that painful reality.
A survey recently found that only 55% of those asked said they

251 Jennifer Liberto, CEOs Earn 343 Times More than Typical Worker, CNN
MONEY (Apr. 20, 2011, 7:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/19/news/
economy/ceo_pay/; David Owens, The Pay Problem: What’s to be Done About C.E.O
Compensation?,
NEW
YORKER,
Oct.
12,
2009,
at
58,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/12/the-pay-problem.
252 Erick Eckholm & Timothy Williams, Anti-Wall Street Protests Spreading to
Cities Large and Small, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/us/anti-wall-street-protests-spread-to-othercities.html.
253 Steven Greenhouse, A Day’s Strike Seeks to Raise Fast-Food Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/business/strike-forday-seeks-to-raise-fast-food-pay.html.
254 President Obama has taken this as a major theme in his second term. See
Gerald F. Seib, Obama’s Second-Term Agenda: Progressive Ideas, Populist
Packaging, WALL ST. J.: CAP. J. (July 26, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323971204578627940606382774.
255 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER 9 (2011).
256 Timothy Noah, The Mobility Myth, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/100516/inequality-mobilityeconomy-america-recession-divergence.
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believed that their children will have a better life than they
have, the lowest percentage since the survey began in 1987.257
D.

Renewing the Call for National Corporate Law

It is time to go beyond sporadic efforts at reform and
enact comprehensive national legislation regulating large public
companies. This is not a new idea. At least three times during
the last century, during the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt,
Franklin Roosevelt, and Jimmy Carter, serious efforts were
made to require that large companies be federally chartered.258
The ensuing legal framework should not endanger the
innovative edge American corporations have long enjoyed in
the global economy. Nor should it diminish the personal
responsibility of each worker to use her or his talents skillfully
for the common good. But it should serve to not only protect
investors more fully from wrongdoing by corporate insiders but
also to mandate a broader purpose for these highly productive
enterprises to make sure they serve the larger public interest.
Such regulation would require, among other things, that
corporations adopt more balanced compensation structures
narrowing the egregious difference that now exists between the
pay of top executives and front-line workers.259 It would also
mandate that these companies make meaningful efforts to
expand their work forces and pay them good wages thus
creating a prosperity that would be shared by a large majority
of our citizens, many of whom are now in danger of falling into
257 Emily Alpert, Amid Slow Economic Recovery, More Americans Identify as
‘Lower Class’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/
2013/sep/18/lower-class-descriptor-rising/.
258 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 597 (2003).
259 Cf. Eduardo Porter, Seeking New Tools to Address a Wage Gap, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2014, at B1. There the author asserts that the wage gap between executives and
workers can best be addressed by corporations themselves and not the government. He
further states that 36% of Republicans say major companies are most responsible for
narrowing the income gap—significantly more than say it is the job of the poor
themselves or the government to do it. Howard Schultz, CEO of Starbucks, has
committed to have his company hire 10,000 veterans over the next five years. He stated
that the company will employ a recruiter who is a veteran and “understands the
language, understands the anxiety and can bridge the gap.” Susan Page, Starbucks CEO:
Honor Vets with a Concert—And a Job, USA TODAY (Nov. 11, 2014),
http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/11/capital-download-howard-schultzveterans-day-concert-and-book/18840931/. Companies are spending huge amounts of
money Wall Street “mega-mergers,” but companies “are not spending money in other
areas. Wage growth remains sluggish, and hiring is growing only modestly.” Even worse,
it is questionable whether these big take-overs benefit the economy as these mergers
“often create redundancies which can lead to job cuts.” David Gelles, Mega Mergers
Popular Again on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2014, at A1.
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a permanent underclass. Such an approach can be justified on
both principled and pragmatic grounds.
First, it is eminently sensible that these large firms
with countrywide and international operations be regulated by
our national government. Observers have long pointed out that
the preeminence of Delaware law in corporate regulation is a
historical anomaly.260 The internal affairs doctrine has allowed
that small, non-industrial state to be the de facto law-giver for
corporate America with continuing charges that firms flock
there to incorporate because of its lax regulation.261 In addition,
there is ample warrant for a national mandate that
corporations have a broader purpose than just profit.
Firms that do business in the corporate form receive
substantial support from the larger community. Shareholders,
who have the ultimate claim on the accumulated wealth of those
companies, are given the privilege of limited liability and
perpetual existence for their business.262 Such businesses are also
granted the legal rights afforded natural persons under the
constitution263 and they are supported by political institutions in
myriad ways. Those include tax breaks, infrastructure
construction, education of their workforce, government contracts,
and financial bailouts. It is therefore only right that large public
companies owe reciprocal duties to society as a whole.
From a practical perspective, corporate executives have
substantial resources under their control. They also have the
expertise to use them to expand the productive capacities of
their enterprises so that they can give meaningful employment
to a larger workforce. In addition, the executives can distribute
the revenue of their firms in ways that both reduce the
egregious income inequality that now threatens the stability of
our society and also promote widespread purchasing power
that will secure a market for their products.
260 In the first part of the 20th century, Delaware copied the corporate act of
New Jersey, which was then the leading jurisdiction for incorporations. When a
reforming Governor named Woodrow Wilson tightened New Jersey’s law, many of the
firms incorporated there migrated to Delaware and never left. See Cary, supra note 47, at
664. Wilson’s reform agenda as governor of New Jersey is described at length in a fine
new biography, Wilson, by A. Scott Berg. See A. SCOTT BERG, WILSON 189-212 (2013).
261 Cary’s famous observation that “there is no public policy left in Delaware
corporate law except the object of raising revenue.” Cary, supra note 47, at 684.
262 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
263 See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010), which is the most notorious example of this where the High Court ruled that a
corporation’s free speech rights prohibited any restrictions on contributions it might
make to political campaigns; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354
(U.S. June 30, 2014).
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As this Article has pointed out, some business leaders
have acknowledged the need for this more pervasive mandate.
A large percentage of the general population recognizes that
personal satisfaction comes from working in enterprises that
not only provide a good living for their employees but also serve
the larger purposes of society.
In addition, a large number of state legislatures have
already led the way here by adding provisions to their
corporate codes that directors may take the interests of an
array of corporate constituents into account.264 More recently,
many states have also allowed for the chartering of so-called
“benefit corporations” that can be set up to not just make profit
but also to achieve broader social goals.265 Those efforts
represent a platform upon which to build national legislation.
CONCLUSION
For the last several decades two seemingly incompatible
ideas have been moving forward in corporate law. One is
shareholder rights and the other is CSR. Yet even the
conservative economist Milton Freedman, the prime spokesperson
for the shareholder primacy approach, conceded that corporations
are bound not only to obey the law but also to abide by ethical
customs. As that sense of public morality has expanded to include
many of the ideas found in CSR, there appears to have emerged a
new “reflective equilibrium” on this issue.
The highly respected social philosopher, John Rawls,266
used that term to describe an adjustment to previously-held
principles brought about by a more complete understanding of
the demands of justice. Now that CSR theory has achieved its
maturity such equipoise may have arrived. Corporate law no
longer need be “schizophrenic” as Chancellor Allen claimed,267
but can embrace as its goals both shareholder rights and CSR.
As this Article has argued, both are important for our society. If,
either by the wise choices of corporate boards or by legislative
mandate, business leaders accept those responsibilities, our
nation and the world will be much the better for it.
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See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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